Let's say you have conditional access, condition X, to a piece of information, condition Y. If Y is met there is a catastrophic change in modern portfolio theory's efficient frontier. Let's further say that the change is not only catastrophic, but, given Y, so extremely obvious that executives in a large number of major corporations, as well as institutional investors, will be liable as individuals, for failure of due diligence under fiduciary responsibility to make even the disappearingly small investment requird to obtain access to Y. In other words, there would be no "safety in numbers" for executives and institutional portfolio managers.
Note, the definition of "obvious" as used above, was not remotely met by the introduction of the web 2 decades ago. I'm talking about something more qualitatively analogous to the market demand for breathable oxygen in the atmosphere -- THAT obvious and while not really that catastrophic to life itself, it may as well be for portfolio management and executive decisions.
In such a scenario there very low, but non-zero, motivation to make investments conditioned on Y until Y is known. And, indeed, there are many such low, but non-zero investments that make rational sense for institutional investors given the magnitude of their portfolios.
However, let's say that condition X requires nothing more than the signing of a CDA with reciprocal disclosure of investment plans conditioned on Y -- but the existence of such plans is a requirement for disclosure of Y.
This requires obtaining the small amounts required to do preliminary investments in speculative planning. Where do you go for such preliminary investments?